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COMMENTS
COMMENT: THE FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
LIFE INSURANCE IN ESTATE PLANNING
I. INTRODUCTION
There are certain characteristics of life insurance that make it
one of the most flexible and useful tools at the hands of the skillful
estate planner. For example, it can be the source of an instant estate
without the years of accumulation necessary for other types of as-
sets. In addition, unless made payable to the decedent's estate, life
insurance will usually bypass probate, which results in many advan-
tages. For one thing, the costs which are associated with probating
a decedent's estate will be lower. Also, the beneficiaries of life insur-
ance can usually obtain the proceeds much faster than the legatees
or distributees can obtain possession of the assets of an estate in
probate. Most importantly, life insurance proceeds will generally be
exempted from the rights of creditors unless the estate is the benefi-
ciary.'
Although the advantages are numerous, the federal tax provi-
sions relating to life insurance are pervasive, and a basic under-
standing of them is essential before incorporating the use of insur-
ance in a plan for distributing the decedent's wealth. The purpose
of this comment is to explore the various federal income, estate and
gift tax consequences of life insurance when used in estate planning.
II. THE INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
The general rule stated in section 101 of the Internal Revenue
Code' is that proceeds received under life insurance policies because
of the death of the insured are excluded from the gross income of
the beneficiary and are, therefore, tax-free. However, if any of such
proceeds are left with the insurance company under an option to pay
interest on the amounts retained, the interest paid on such amounts
is ordinary income. 3 Likewise, if the proceeds are to be paid in
installments, the interest element of each installment is ordinary
income.4 A surviving spouse is allowed an exclusion of $1000 per year
1. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3228 (Repl. 1966).
2. I.R.C. § 101(a)(1). Unless otherwise specified, all sections cited in this comment are
to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, as amended.
3. I.R.C. § 101(c). Treas. Reg. § 1.101-3(a) (1957).
4. I.R.C. § 101(d). Treas. Reg. § 1.101-4 (1957) should be consulted to determine what
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for the interest element received if the proceeds are to be paid in
installments.'
It should be noted that this exclusion under Section 101 only
applies when the proceeds are paid "by reason of the death of the
insured." Therefore, the surrender of a life insurance policy for its
cash value while the insured is still alive will be a taxable transac-
tion.
An exception to the general rule of tax-free receipt of proceeds
is the "transferee for value" rule.' Under this rule, if the insurance
policy has been transferred for a valuable consideration, the benefi-
ciary is taxed on the amounts received in excess of what was paid
for the policy, plus any premiums paid after the transfer.7 The
"transferee for value" rule does not apply if the basis of the policy
in the hands of the transferee is determined by reference to the
transferer's basis8 (for example, received in a tax-free exchange), or
if the transfer was to the insured, a partner of the insured, a partner-
ship including the insured, or a corporation in which the insured was
a shareholder or officer.'
It should be noted that the "transferee for value" rule does not
apply if the transferee is a partner of the insured but does apply if
the transferee is a fellow shareholder. This could have harsh tax
consequences in a close corporation when a cross-purchase share-
holder buy-out agreement 0 is funded by life insurance. When one
shareholder dies holding life insurance policies on the lives of the
surviving shareholders, the remaining shareholders may wish to
purchase those policies from the deceased shareholder's estate. In
such a situation the "transferee for value" rule applies, and the
amount of each installment is considered a tax-free receipt of proceeds, and what amount is
considered taxable interest.
5. I.R.C. § 101(d)(1)(B). It should be noted that this $1000 exclusion is only available
if the proceeds are received in installments, not if interest alone is being paid on amounts
left with the insurer. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-3(a) (1957) implies that a "substantial diminution"
of the principal amount is required before the exclusion of § 101(d)(1)(B) is available.
6. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).
7. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(2) (1957), which states the general rule that once
the "transferee for value" rule attaches, subsequent transferees, though gratuitous, will be
subject to it.
8. I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A).
9. Id. § 101(a)(2)(B).
10. This is an agreement among the shareholders that when one of them dies, the
remaining shareholders will purchase the stock of the deceased shareholder from his estate.
When such a plan is funded by life insurance, each shareholder will typically take out policies
on the lives of each of the other shareholders naming himself as beneficiary. Then when a




ultimate beneficiary will probably be taxed on a portion of the pro-
ceeds.
To summarize the income tax consequences, in the usual situa-
tion life insurance proceeds received by reason of the death of the
insured will escape income taxation.
III. ESTATE TAXATION OF THE PROCEEDS
A. Section 2042 - In general.
Section 2042 is the only estate tax provision which deals specifi-
cally with the taxation of life insurance. The section is composed of
two parts. Under the first, the decedent's gross estate includes the
proceeds of insurance on his life if such proceeds are "receivable by
the executor."" The second part taxes insurance which is
"receivable by other beneficiaries" with respect to which the dece-
dent possessed at death any "incidents of ownership.'
2
B. Section 2042(1) - Receivable by the executor.
Although the Code speaks in terms of the "executor," the regu-
lations and all case law interpret this to mean the "estate" of the
decedent, whether it be testate or intestate. It is not necessary that
the estate be specifically named as beneficiary for the proceeds to
be receivable by the executor. 3 In one case the proceeds were paya-
ble not to the executor but to a trustee of a trust, the terms of which
subjected the trust assets to the prior payment of expenses of last
illness and burial. The proceeds were held includible to the extent
of such expenses, whether they were actually paid out of the pro-
-ceeds or not.' It was the obligation of payment to the estate, not
the actual payment, which was important.
Another problem arises where the proceeds are payable to a
trust, and the trustee is authorized, but not required, to use the
proceeds to pay debts and taxes of the decedent. At least one court
has held that the proceeds are includible only where the trustee is
under a legally binding obligation to use them in payment of debts
and taxes of the estate. 5 In that case the trustee was given discre-
tion to use the proceeds for such a purpose but he did not actually
use them to pay claims against the estate.
11. I.R.C. § 2042(1).
12. Id. § 2042(2).
13. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (1958).
14. Pacific National Bank v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939).
15. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 871 (1939).
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Still unanswered is the question of what happens when the
trustee is not required to use the proceeds to pay debts or taxes of
the estate but in fact does use them for this purpose. It would appear
that the theory of taxability under Section 2042 is based upon the
control by the decedent over the disposition of the insurance pro-
ceeds. If discretion is given to the trustee, the decedent has appar-
ently parted with any such control, and he should not be taxed
simply because the trustee exercised that discretion in favor of his
estate.
C. Section 2042(2) - Receivable by other beneficiaries and the
incidents of ownership test.
The term "incidents of ownership" is not limited to ownership
of the policy in the technical sense. Generally, it refers to the right
of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of the policy.
The term includes, but is not limited to, the power to:
1. change beneficiaries;
2. surrender or cancel the policy;
3. assign the policy;
4. revoke an assignment;
5. pledge the policy for a loan; and
6. obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of
the policy.'"
The statute and regulations also state that the term "incidents
of ownership" includes a reversionary interest in the policy or its
proceeds (which includes a possibility that the policy or its proceeds
may return to the decedent or his estate or may become subject to
a power of disposition by him) if the value of the reversionary in-
terest exceeded five percent of the value of the policy immediately
before the death of the decedent.'7
In the case of a sole or controlling shareholder of a corporation,
the incidents of ownership owned by the corporation in policies on
the life of the decedent shareholder will be attributed to the dece-
dent if the proceeds are payable to someone other than the corpora-
tion.'" To be considered a controlling shareholder, the decedent
must own stock possessing more than fifty percent of the total com-
16. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958).
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(3) (1974). To determine the value of a reversionary inter-
est, this regulation states that the principles of Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(c)(3) and (4) (1958)
are to be used.
18. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6) (1974).
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bined voting power of the corporation. If the proceeds are payable
to the corporation, however, the corporation's incidents of owner-
ship are not attributed to the decedent because the value of the
proceeds is reflected in the value of the decedent's stock in the
corporation. 9 Since the value of the stock is already included in the
decedent's gross estate, attribution of the corporation's incidents of
ownership to the decedent would result in including the proceeds in
the gross estate twice.
Section 2042(2) states that the incidents of ownership may be
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person.
This may result in the inclusion of insurance proceeds when the
decedent actually exercised very little control over the policies. In
one case 0 the decedent had never owned the policy in the technical
sense. It was issued to his wife on an application initiated by her,
but she transferred the policy to a trust. The trust agreement pro-
vided that she could modify or alter the trust or revoke it in whole
or in part only with the written consent of her daughter and her
husband, the decedent. The entire proceeds were held includible in
the decedent's gross estate because this amounted to the possession
of incidents of ownership in conjunction with another. By altering
the trust, the parties could have changed the beneficiary of the
policy. It was unimportant that the decedent could not initiate the
changes, as long as his consent was required.
Along these same lines, it is important to note that there is no
"adverse interest" concept in this section, although this is some-
times important in other sections of the Code. If an incident of
ownership is exercisable in conjunction with an adverse party who
in actuality would never consent to such an exercise, the proceeds
are nevertheless includible because of the specific language used in
Section 2042(2).
There has been some controversy over whether the actual abil-
ity to exercise incidents of ownership is necessary. In 1961, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ruled that it was the legal ability to exercise
such incidents of ownership rather than the actual ability that was
controlling." In this particular situation the decedent purchased an
accident insurance policy on his life before boarding an airplane. He
reserved the right to change the beneficiary but mailed the policy
to the named beneficiary from the air terminal and immediately
boarded the plane. He was later killed when the plane crashed. The
19. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277.
20. Comm'r v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956).
21.. Rev. Rul. 61-123, 1961-2 C.B. 151.
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Service said that since he reserved the right to change beneficiaries
the insurance proceeds were includible in his gross estate even
though, as a practical matter, he could not have exercised the right
while the plane was in flight. The Service announced, in effect, that
it would only look to the facts evident from the policy itself, rather
than the peculiar circumstances, to determine whether the proceeds
were to be taxed. The United States Supreme Court adopted this
"policy facts" doctrine four years later in Commissioner v. Estate
of Noel,22 which was another air flight insurance case.
23
One major problem within the incidents of ownership area is
the situation in which the insured is named the trustee over a trust
created by another person and the property of the trust includes
insurance policies on the insured's life. In such a situation, the
insured may possess incidents of ownership over the policies in his
capacity as trustee. The problem was presented in Estate of Frue-
hauf v. Commissioner, ' 4 in which the decedent's wife had purchased
insurance policies on his life. She died and her will bequeathed the
policies to a trust in which the decedent was named a co-trustee and
a life beneficiary of the income from the trust. Since the insurance
policies produced no income, he appeared to have no beneficial
interest in them other than his interest as a trustee. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's broad holding
that a trustee who possesses incidents of ownership in policies on his
life only in a fiduciary capacity must nevertheless have the proceeds
included in his gross estate under Section 2042(2). However, the
court distinguished this particular case because the decedent could
have realized a benefit in his personal capacity by choosing to sur-
render the policies for their cash surrender value, investing the pro-
ceeds and receiving the income therefrom as income beneficiary.
The proceeds were therefore included in his gross estate.
In Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner5 the facts were similar to
Fruehauf except that the insured-trustee was given no beneficial
22. 380 U.S. 678 (1965). The Court held that the decedent possessed incidents of owner-
ship, even though the contract terms provided that the policies could not be assigned, nor
could the beneficiary be changed, without a written endorsement on the policies. This was
impossible at the moment of death since the decedent had given the policies to his wife before
boarding the plane.
23. See also Kearns v. United States, 399 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1968), where insurance
proceeds were includible in the decedent's gross estate when he retained the right to change
beneficiaries, among other rights, even though a corporation was the named beneficiary, the
premiums were paid by it, the policies were carried as an asset on the corporate books, the
policies were assigned as collateral for loans to the corporation, and the corporation had
physical custody of the policies.
24. 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970).
25. 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
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interest in the income or corpus of the trust. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the insured did not possess any
incidents of ownership under Section 2042(2) upon his death. The
court said at page 701:
It seems significant to us that the reference point in the regulation
2
for "incidents of ownership" is "the right . . . to the economic
benefits of the policy," since there was no way in which Skifter
could have exercised his powers to derive for himself any economic
benefit from these insurance policies. (Footnote added).
Under the Fruehauf and Skifter decisions, the test appears to
be whether the insured-trustee can derive any economic benefit
from the policies in his individual capacity; if not, he will not be
deemed to possess any incidents of ownership. In Terriberry v.
United States, 7 however, the Fifth Circuit refused to follow
Fruehauf and Skifter and held that the trustee of a trust which held
insurance policies on his life could be taxed on the proceeds under
Section 2042(2) even though he could not in any event realize any
economic benefit from the policies. There was a vigorous dissent
which stated that Fruehauf and Skifter should have been followed.
In Revenue Ruling 76-261,2 the Service announced that it would
follow the holding in Terriberry; therefore, it has taken the position
that the proceeds will be includible where the decedent possessed
any incidents of ownership at his death, even though held only in a
fiduciary capacity. About the best that can be said for this
"inadvertent trustee" problem is that the question of inclusion
under the "incidents of ownership" test is still undecided. With
different circuits holding inconsistently, the United States Supreme
Court will probably be called upon to decide the question.
D. Section 2035 - The contemplation of death problem.
If an insured makes a gift of an insurance policy along with all
incidents of ownership within three years of death, the proceeds will
be included in his gross estate under Section 2035 as a gift made in
contemplation of death. 29 However, a different problem arises when
26. The court was referring to Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958).
27. 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
28. Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 276.
29. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there was only a rebuttable presumption that a
gift made within three years of death was made in contemplation of death. The gift was,
therefore, included in the decedent's gross estate unless the decedent's executor or adminis-
trator could prove otherwise. The presumption was eliminated by the new Act, so that any
gift made within three years of death will automatically be included in the decedent's gross
19781
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the policy was given away more than three years before the insured's
death, but the insured continued to pay the premiums within three
years of death. There are three possibilities for determining the
amount of the proceeds to be included in the insured's gross estate:
1. the full amount of the proceeds, on the theory that if the
insured had not paid the last premium the policy might have
lapsed, and it was his act made in contemplation of death that kept
the policy alive;
2. a pro rata portion of the proceeds, based upon a fraction in
which the numerator is the amount of premiums paid during the
three years preceding death and the denominator is the total
amount of premiums paid; or
3. the amount of the premiums paid within three years of
death, on the theory that only the money gifts of the premiums were
in contemplation of death.
30
The Internal Revenue Service announced in 1967 that the sec-
ond alternative above would be followed. The ruling stated in part
that:
a premium payment under a contract of life insurance by other
than the owner of the policy is analogous to the gift of specific
property by the donor to the owner. Unlike the unrestricted gift of
money, a premium payment is a gift of insurance protection, a
transfer of an interest in the policy which is transmitted at death
into the proceeds of the policy.'
The courts were not receptive to the ruling and almost uniformly
rejected it.32 In 1971, the Service revoked Revenue Ruling 67-463 and
adopted alternative three above in Revenue Ruling 71-497. 33 In this
ruling the decedent had purchased and transferred all incidents of
ownership in a whole life policy and a five-year term policy on his
life but had continued to pay the premiums until his death. The
Service announced that only the amount of premiums paid within
three years of death would be included in the decedent's gross estate
and that no part of the proceeds would be included.
The Service's position in Revenue Ruling 71-497 has gained
added significance under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 3 at least
estate, except to the extent of the annual $3000 exclusion. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1525, 1848 (1976) (amending I.R.C. § 2035).
30. See Tax Management Portfolio, Life Insurance, No. lll-3d, A-11 (1972).
31. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 C.B. 327.
32. See, e.g., Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
33. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329.
34. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(5), 90 Stat. 1525, 1848 (1976)
(amending I.R.C. § 2035).
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where the premium payments are less than the $3000 per donee
annual exclusion from gift tax.35 If the premium payments within
three years of death are of a present interest so as to qualify for the
exclusion, the new Act provides that even the payment of premiums
within the $3000 limit will not be considered to have been made in
contemplation of death. For the gift of premiums to be a present
interest, the donee of the policy must generally own the policy out-
right. 6 However, if the gift is to a trust, it will generally be consid-
ered a gift of a future interest and will not qualify for the annual
exclusion ."
A related problem is presented when the decedent never owned
the insurance policy on his life but paid the premiums on the policy
within three years of his death. This situation was also present in
Revenue Ruling 71-497.18 The Service ruled that the proceeds of a
one-year accidental death policy in which the insured was never the
owner but paid the premiums would be fully includible in his gross
estate under Section 2035. This position taken by the Service was
given judicial approval by the Fifth Circuit in Bel v. United States.3"
The court was faced with facts almost identical to the situation in
the ruling and held that the act of the decedent in procuring the one-
year accidental death policy and paying the premiums thereon was
a "transfer" within the meaning of Section 2035. The court said:
In our opinion the broad legal principle enunciated by the Su-
preme Court . . .is that the word "transfer" is not limited to the
passing of property directly from the donor to the transferee, but
encompasses a donation "procured through expenditures by the
decedent with the purpose effected at his death, of having it pass
to another."40
Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner41 presented a new twist on
the value of an insurance policy to be included in the insured-
decedent's gross estate when the policy itself was transferred within
three years of death. The decedent transferred a whole life policy to
his son six months before his death. Before that time he had made
fifty-five monthly premium payments on the policy. After the trans-
fer the son made seven premium payments. The Tax Court" held
35. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
36. See Treas. Reg. § 2 5 .2503-3(a) (1958), and discussion under part IV below.
37. See Treas. Reg. § 2 5 .2503-3(c), Ex. (2) (1958), and discussion under part IV below.
38. Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329.
39.. 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
40. Id. at 691, quoting Chase Nat'l. Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 337 (1929).
41. 521 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. Estate of Silverman, 61 T.C. 605 (1974).
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that the amount includible in the decedent's gross estate under
Section 2035 was 55/62 of the face amount of the policy, which was
his pro rata share of the premium payments, rather than the full
amount of the proceeds. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision but expressed some doubt
about prorating the proceeds in this manner. It hinted that if the
Service had raised the issue, it might have included the entire face
amount in the decedent's gross estate rather than the fraction that
was included.43 It is, therefore, doubtful that the case can be cited
for the proposition that premium payments made by the donee of a
policy transferred in contemplation of death will reduce the amount
includible under Section 2035.
E. Section 2033 - Taxation in the estate of someone other than
the insured.
Where the decedent is the owner of a life insurance policy on
the life of someone else, the policy is considered property under
Section 2033,11 and the value of the policy is included in the dece-
dent's gross estate should he die before the insured.45 The amount
to be included is not the face amount of the policy because the
insured is still alive and the policy has therefore not matured. If it
is a term policy, nothing is included because the policy has no value
until the death of the insured. However, in a whole life policy the
owner does possess valuable rights in the policy, and the problem
becomes how to value these rights. The regulations state that the
proper amount to be included is the replacement value of the policy,
rather than its cash surrender value.4" In the case of a single prem-
ium or paid-up policy, the replacement value is the amount that a
commercial insurance company would charge for a single premium
contract of the same amount on the life of someone the same age as
the insured. If additional premiums are to be paid on the policy, the
value is approximated using a formula provided in the regulations.,7
A peculiar valuation problem arises when the owner of the pol-
icy and the insured die simultaneously. Should the method in the
regulations 8 be used (replacement value), or should the entire pro-
ceeds be included on the theory that the policy has matured? After
43. Estate of Silverman v. Comm'r, 521 F.2d 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. I.R.C. § 2033.
45. See Estate of Donaldson, 31 T.C. 729 (1959).
46. Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a) (1958).
47. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(3), Ex. (3) (1958).
48. Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(1958).
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an assertion by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
that the entire proceeds were includible and a decision by the Tax
Court to that effect, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed in Estate of Wien v. Commissioner."g The court noted that
under Georgia law when the insured and the owner-beneficiary die
simultaneously, the insured is presumed to have survived the
owner-beneficiary, and it held that the replacement value should
accordingly be applied.50
In connection with the discussion of Section 2033, it should be
noted that if the alternate valuation date is chosen by the executor,51
and the insured dies within the six-month period, the amount to be
included in the owner-decedent's gross estate is the full face amount
of the policy."
IV. GETTING THE PROCEEDS OUT OF THE GROSS
ESTATE - GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES
A transfer of a life insurance policy by the insured during his
life is subject to gift taxation, as long as he has successfully divested
himself of all incidents of ownership and the beneficiary is not his
estate.5 3 The method for determining the value of the gift is the same
as the one used for valuing insurance policies on the life of someone
other than the decedent for estate tax purposes, which is the re-
placement value of the policy.
54
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 minimized the benefit of making
lifetime gifts of life insurance policies by substituting a uniform rate
for lifetime transfers and transfers made at death in place of the
previously lower gift tax rates.55 It further minimized the benefit by
cumulating lifetime transfers with death transfers for purposes of
calculating the estate tax, thus placing death transfers at a higher
49. 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971). Accord, Estate of Meltzer v. Comm'r, 439 F.2d 798 (4th
Cir. 1971); Estate of Chown v. Comm'r, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970); Old Kent Bank and
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 430 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1970).
50. The state law referred to was Georgia's version of the Simultaneous Death Act
which at last count has been adopted by 47 states (including Arkansas) and the District of
Columbia. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 61-127 (Repl. 1971).
51. I.R.C. § 2032.
52. Rev. Rul. 63-52, 1963-1 C.B. 173.
53. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1958). If the insured has not divested himself of all
incidents of ownership or if the proceeds are payable to his estate, the face amount will still
be includible in his gross estate under § 2042 upon his death. The Service thought it was
undesirable to impose a gift tax unless the insured has successfully removed the proceeds from
his gross estate.
54. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) (1958).
55. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a), 90 Stat. 1525, 1846 (1976)
(amending I.R.C. § 2001).
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rate on the progressive scale." However, it may still be advanta-
geous to make gifts of policies because of the difference in the
amount subject to taxation. As noted earlier, the amount subject to
gift taxation is the replacement value of the policy whereas the
amount subject to estate taxation is the face amount. The replace-
ment value will obviously always be the lesser of the two.
One problem concerning the gift tax is whether the annual
exclusion of $3000 under Section 2503(b) is applicable to gifts of life
insurance policies or to gifts of premiums on policies previously
given away. Since Section 2503(b) only applies to gifts of a present
interest, it becomes necessary to determine whether life insurance
qualifies as a present interest.
As long as there is an outright gift of the policy, the regulations
state that it is not a gift of a future interest merely because payment
of the policy cannot be received until the death of the insured. 7 The
donee is receiving more than just the right to the proceeds upon the
death of the insured. Thus, if the donee receives the full rights to
surrender the policy or convert it into cash immediately, it is treated
as a gift of a present interest and qualifies for the annual exclusion."
However, if the gift is to a trust, the question becomes whether
the beneficiary has these rights immediately. With a few exceptions,
a gift in trust will be treated as a gift of a future interest." As to
gifts of premiums on policies previously given away, if the owner has
a present interest in the policy, the premium payments will be gifts
of a present interest.'" If the owner only has a future interest in the
policy, however, the premium payments will also constitute gifts of
future interest."
A further concern is whether a gift of life insurance policies to
a spouse will qualify for the marital deduction under Section 2523.62
As in the case of the annual exclusion, an outright transfer to the
spouse will qualify for the marital deduction. If the transfer is in
56. Id. § 2001(b) (amending I.R.C. § 2502(a)).
57. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958).
58. C. Lowndes, R. Kramer & J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 838 (3d ed.
1974).
59. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c), Ex. (2) (1958); C. Lowndes, R. Kramer & J. McCord,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 839 (3d ed. 1974).
60. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c), Ex. (6) (1958).
61. Francis P. Bolton, 1 T.C. 717 (1943).
62. I.R.C. § 2523, as amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(b),
90 Stat. 1525, 1854 (1976). This section generally allows the donor to take a deduction from
gifts made to his spouse of the total amount of the gift up to a total of $100,000, and 50% of




trust, however, various requirements must be met. The conditions
are similar to those required for the estate tax marital deduction. "
The requirement that the donee spouse be entitled to the income for
life cannot normally be met with a gift of insurance policies in trust
because they are not income-producing assets. 4 There are at least
two possible solutions to this problem. If the donee spouse is given
the right to require the conversion of the policies to income-
producing property, the gift will apparently qualify for the marital
deduction. "5 The problem can also be avoided by the use of an
"estate trust," which provides that upon the death of the spouse the
property in the trust will pass to his or her estate. The "estate trust"
will qualify for the marital deduction because it is not a "terminable
interest."66
V. CONCLUSION
After the decision to use life insurance as part of an estate plan
has been made, it becomes necessary to explore the tax ramifica-
tions so that asset shrinkage due to taxes can be minimized. If gifts
are to be made of some of the policies, a careful analysis of which
ones to give away can prove to be beneficial. For example, the gift
of a term policy will produce no gift tax liability while the gift of a
whole life policy will. Furthermore, if the choice is between two
whole life policies of the same face value, the newer policy will
produce less gift tax because of its lower replacement value.
After a life insurance policy is given away, the insured should
make absolutely sure that he has retained no incidents of ownership
in the policy and should be certain that his estate cannot be made
a beneficiary of the proceeds. It would be disastrous for an insured
to make the decision to part with all effective control over the policy
63. Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)-l(a) (1958). The conditions are as follows:
(1) The donee spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income from the entire
interest or a specific portion of the entire interest, or to a specific portion of all the
income from the entire interest;
(2) The income payable to the donee spouse must be payable annually or at more
frequent intervals;
(3) The donee spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or a
specific portion to either herself or her estate;
(4) The power in the donee spouse must be exercisable by her alone and (whether
exercisable by will or during life) must be exercisable in all events; and
(5) The entire interest or a specific portion must not be subject to a power in any
other person to appoint any part to any person other than the donee spouse.
64. Estate ofC. C. Smith, 23 T.C. 367 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(e)-(1)(f)(5) (1958).
65. Estate of C. C. Smith, 23 T.C. 367, 371 (1954).
66. I.R.C. § 2523(b).
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and then have the proceeds included in his gross estate anyway
because of an oversight.
It should not be inferred from this discussion that making gifts
of life insurance is always the best approach to take. It may be
necessary or desirable to make the proceeds payable to the dece-
dent's estate to provide the liquidity needed to pay debts and taxes,
especially if all of the other assets of the estate are nonliquid.
The insured may want to consider setting up an inter vivos
insurance trust to use as a will substitute or for various other rea-
sons. The trust can be revocable or irrevocable, and funded or un-
funded. If the trust is revocable there are no gift tax consequences
upon its creation and the proceeds will be included in the insured's
gross estate at death. If it is irrevocable, there may be gift tax
liability and all the problems relating to the "incidents of owner-
ship" test and the "contemplation of death" problem will be pres-
ent. The subject of life insurance trusts is sufficiently broad to war-
rant a separate comment, and this is but a cursory introduction to
them.
This comment is not intended to be an exhaustive source of all
the possible tax consequences of life insurance within the context
of estate planning. It is hoped that it may serve as an outline for
someone considering the use of life insurance, with an emphasis on
some of the problem areas. In the constantly changing area of fed-
eral taxation, however, a study of the current status of the law is
always essential.
John B. Peace
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